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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT
COUNTY OF FRANKLIN
____________________________________________X
In the Matter of the Application of
JAMES FREEMAN, #88-B-1480,
Petitioner,
for Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules

DECISION AND JUDGMENT
RJI #16-1-2013-0137.39
INDEX # 2013-291
ORI #NY016015J

-against-

ANDREA EVANS, Chairwoman,
NYS Board of Parole,
Respondent.
____________________________________________X
This is a proceeding for judgment pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR that was
originated by the Petition of James Freeman, verified on March 15, 2013 and filed in the
Franklin County Clerk’s office on March 28, 2013. Petitioner, who is an inmate at the
Franklin Correctional Facility, is challenging the August 2012 determination denying him
parole and directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The Court issued an
Order to Show Cause on April 2, 2013 and has received and reviewed respondent’s Answer
and Return, including in camera materials, verified on May 24, 2013 and supported by
the May 24, 2013 Letter Memorandum of Glen Francis Michaels, Esq., Assistant Attorney
General in Charge. The Court has also received and reviewed petitioner’s undated Reply
thereto, filed in the Franklin County Clerk’s office on May 31, 2013.
On June 29, 1988 petitioner was sentenced in Supreme Court, Kings County, to a
controlling indeterminate sentence of 22 years to life upon his convictions of the crimes
of Murder 2° and Criminal Possession of a Weapon 2°. On September 4, 1990, petitioner
was sentenced in Chemung County Court, “as a predicate felony offender,” to a controlling
indeterminate sentence of 3½ to 7 years upon his convictions of the crimes of Assault 2°
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and Attempted Assault 2°. This Court notes that the criminal act underlying petitioner’s
1990 Chemung County sentences was committed at a time when petitioner was already
incarcerated in DOCCS custody as a result of the 1988 Kings County sentence. Both
convictions were affirmed on direct appeal. See People v. Freeman, 162 AD2d 704, lv den
76 NY2d 939 and People v. Freeman, 184 AD2d 864, lv den 80 NY2d 903.
On August 8, 2012 petitioner made his initial appearance before a Parole Board.
Following that appearance a decision was rendered denying him discretionary release and
directing that he be held for an additional 24 months. The parole denial determination
reads, in relevant part, as follows:
“FOLLOWING CAREFUL REVIEW AND DELIBERATION OF YOUR
RECORD AND INTERVIEW, THIS PANEL CONCLUDES THAT
DISCRETIONARY RELEASE IS NOT PRESENTLY WARRANTED DUE TO
CONCERN FOR THE PUBLIC SAFETY AND WELFARE.
THE
FOLLOWING FACTORS WERE PROPERLY WEIGHED AND
CONSIDERED. YOUR INSTANT OFFENSE IN BROOKLYN IN JUNE
1987, INVOLVED YOUR FATALLY SHOOTING A MALE VICTIM. WHILE
CONFINED AT ELMIRA C.F. IN 1990, YOU INCURRED AN ASSAULT 2ND
AND AN ATT. ASSAULT 2ND.
YOUR HISTORY INDICATES YOU WERE ON YO PROBATION AT THE
TIME OF THE FATAL SHOOTING.
YOUR INSTITUTIONAL PROGRAMING INDICATES PROGRESS AND
ACHIEVEMENT WHICH IS NOTED TO YOUR DISCIPLINARY RECORD
REFLECTS SEVEN (7) TIER II AND FIVE (5) TIER III REPORTS. YOU
HAVE SERVED SHU TIME.
THE PANEL NOTES YOUR POSITIVE INSTITUTIONAL PROGRESS,
HOWEVER, THE PANEL IS CONCERNED WITH YOUR TIER III
DISCIPLINARY ISSUES.
THE PANEL FURTHER NOTES THAT IT HAS CONSIDERED ALL
REQUIRED FACTORS IN THE FILE.
REQUIRED STATUTORY FACTORS HAVE BEEN CONSIDERED,
INCLUDING YOUR RISK TO THE COMMUNITY, REHABILITATION
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EFFORTS, AND YOUR NEEDS FOR SUCCESSFUL COMMUNITY RE-ENTRY.
YOUR DISCRETIONARY RELEASE, AT THIS TIME, WOULD THUS NOT
BE COMPATIBLE WITH THE WELFARE OF SOCIETY AT LARGE, AND
WOULD TEND TO DEPRECATE THE SERIOUSNESS OF THE INSTANT
OFFENSE(S), AND UNDERMINE RESPECT FOR THE LAW.”
The document perfecting petitioner’s administrative appeal from the August 2012 parole
denial determination (“APPELLANT’S BRIEF”) was received by the DOCCS Parole
Appeals Unit on October 24, 2012. The Appeals Unit, however, failed to issue its findings
and recommendation within the 4-month time frame set forth in 9 NYCRR §8006.4(c).
This proceeding ensued.
Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A), as amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C , subpart A,
§§38-f and 38-f-1, effective March 31, 2011, provides, in relevant part, as follows:
“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a reward for
good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after
considering if there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is
released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and
that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not
so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for the
law. In making the parole release decision, the procedures adopted
pursuant to subdivision four of section two hundred fifty-nine-c of this
article shall require that the following be considered: (i) the institutional
record including program goals and accomplishments, academic
achievements, vocational education, training or work assignments, therapy
and interactions with staff and inmates . . . (iii) release plans including
community resources, employment, education and training and support
services available to the inmate . . . (vii) the seriousness of the offense with
due consideration to the type of sentence, length of sentence and
recommendations of the sentencing court, the district attorney, the attorney
for the inmate, the presentence probation report as well as consideration of
any mitigating and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest prior
to confinement; and (viii) prior criminal record, including the nature and
pattern of offenses, adjustment to any previous probation or parole
supervision and institutional confinement . . .”
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Discretionary parole release determinations are statutorily deemed to be judicial
functions which are not reviewable if done in accordance with law (Executive Law §259i(5) unless there has been a showing of irrationality bordering on impropriety. See Silmon
v. Travis, 95 NY2d 470, Vasquez v. Dennison, 28 AD3d 908, Webb v. Travis, 26 AD3d
614 and Coombs v. New York State Division of Parole, 25 AD3d 1051. Unless the
petitioner makes a “convincing demonstration to the contrary” the Court must presume
that the New York State Board of Parole acted properly in accordance with statutory
requirements. See Nankervis v. Dennison, 30 AD3d 521, Zane v. New York State
Division of Parole, 231 AD2d 848 and Mc Lain v. Division of Parole, 204 AD2d 456.
Executive Law §259-c(4) was amended by L 2011, ch 62, part C, subpart A, §38-b,
effective October 1, 2011, to provide that the New York State Board of Parole shall “. . .
establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions as required by law.
Such written procedures shall incorporate risk and needs principles to measure the
rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such
persons upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in determining
which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”1
During the course of petitioner’s August 8, 2012 Parole Board interview
Commissioner Ludlow referenced the COMPAS risk and needs assessment instrument
that had been prepared in conjunction with the Board’s consideration of petitioner for
discretionary release. According to Commissioner Ludlow, the COMPAS “ . . . computer

1

Prior to the amendment the statute had provided, in relevant part, that the Board of Parole shall
“. . . establish written guidelines for its use in making parole decisions as required by law . . . Such written
guidelines may consider the use of a risk and needs assessment instrument to assist members of the state
board of parole in determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”
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generated score has you [petitioner] at a low risk for felony violence, arrest and
absconding if you are on parole.”
To the extent the parole denial determination was predicated upon the Board’s
concern for the public safety and welfare, petitioner argues that the denial determination
must be considered “arbitrary and capricious in nature.” Alluding to the COMPAS
computer-generated low risk scores referenced by Commissioner Ludlow, petitioner goes
on to argue that he “ . . . cannot be found to be a low risk by Respondent, then deemed to
be a threat to public safety by respondent . . .” The Court, however, is not persuaded by
this argument.
Since petitioner does not specifically challenge the implementation procedures put
into effect by the Board of Parole in response to the amendment to Executive Law §259c(4), such issue will not be addressed in this Decision and Judgment. Although the
Appellate Division, Third Department has indicated that a risk and needs assessment
instrument (such as COMPAS) must be utilized in connection with post- September 30,
2011 discretionary parole release determinations (see Garfield v. Evans, 108 AD3d 830),
this Court finds nothing in Garfield or the amended statute to suggest that the quantified
risk assessment determined through utilization of the needs and risk assessment
instrument supercedes the independent discretionary authority of the Board of Parole to
determine whether there is a reasonable probability that a prospective parolee would, if
released, live and remain at liberty without violating the law, whether the release of the
prospective parolee would be compatible with the welfare of society and/or whether the
release of the prospective parolee would so deprecate the seriousness of his/her crime as
to undermine respect for the law. In this regard it is noted that the “risk and need
principles” that must be incorporated pursuant to the amended version of Executive Law
§259-c(4), while intended to measure the rehabilitation of a prospective parolee as well
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as the likelihood that he/she would succeed under community-based parole supervision,
are only intended to “ . . . assist members of the state board of parole in determining
which inmates may be released to parole supervision . . .”

Executive Law §259-

c(4)(emphasis added). Thus, while the Parole Board was required to consider the
COMPAS instrument when exercising its discretionary authority to determine whether
or not petitioner should be released from DOCCS custody to community-based parole
supervision, it was not bound by the quantified results of the COMPAS assessment and
was free to grant or deny parole based upon its independent assessment of the factors set
forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A). See Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc 3d 896 (Sup Ct,
Albany Co., June 28, 2013). In the case at bar the Board ultimately concluded, however,
that a denial of parole was warranted based upon the nature of the crimes underlying
petitioner’s incarceration, the fact that petitioner was on YO probation status at the time
of the fatal shooting underlying his 1988 Kings County conviction as well as petitioner’s
problematic prison disciplinary record.
Petitioner also argues that the parole denial determination resulted from the
personal bias of one parole commissioner. In this regard petitioner alleges that when he
was questioned by Commissioner Ferguson during the course of the August 8, 2012 parole
interview, “ . . . the Commissioner led off by calling the Petitioner a liar that he knew
Petitioner was lying and that it was not going to end good for Petitioner. Commissioner
Ferguson never stated what the Petitioner was lying about, but there was no denying that
Petitioner was getting denied parole because of Commissioner Ferguson’s personal bias.”
During the course of the August 8, 2012 parole interview petitioner, responding
to questioning by Commissioner Ludlow, described the events leading up to the fatal
Kings County shooting. According to petitioner’s description, he had received word that
his younger brother and a group of friends “ . . . was going somewhere to be involved in
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an incident. And I was going to get him so he wouldn’t be involved . . .” Petitioner went
on to state that when he arrived at the scene of the incident his brother was already part
of the group that was attacking an individual and petitioner tried to pull him away.
According to petitioner, the individual being assaulted by the group “ . . . swung at me,
and as a result that’s when I reached for a gun and started shooting.” Later during the
parole interview Commissioner Ludlow turned the questioning over to Commissioner
Ferguson and the following colloquy occurred:
“COMMISSIONER
FERGUSON:

A [petitioner]:
COMMISSIONER
FERGUSON:

In terms of your conduct, you indicated
that you carried a gun because you were
bullied and became an angry person.
Yes, sir.
So they gave you probation for that.
While on probation you get yourself
another gun. You described yourself as
having been conditioned to respond
when you are struck physically to pull
out a gun and shoot someone. And you
are indicating you went out - - the
problem I have is I don’t feel you are
being honest. And for me, when you
come in here and you are not honest
that can often be a game ender. When
you are saying that you went to play the
peacemaker and get your brother and
prevent him from being involved in a
situation, and while breaking up a fight
you take out a weapon on a guy who is
already outnumbered 4-to-1, you make
it 5-to-1, I can’t imagine he’s doing too
well with four people beating him up,
and somehow you get hit and need to
shoot him twice. I am not done. You
then get incarcerated and while
incarcerated for a violent crime, you
decide to carry a weapon. You then
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introduce the weapon to a the [sic] fight
where there’s no indication this person
had a weapon, and then the
confrontation is so violent that an
officer is swept up in this confrontation.
So I am trying to reconcile that, with you
telling us that you are the peacemaker
going out to save your brother from a
difficult situation, when, it’s very clear
you established yourself as a violent
person with violent propensity. So, I
can’t reconcile that. How do you?
A:

COMMISSIONER
FERGUSON:

A:

COMMISSIONER
FERGUSON:

It’s a contradiction. But I was never
assaulted, I never said that Mr.
Middleton [the shooting victim] hit me.
I stated when I went to get my brother
to grab him, he swung at me, and
without thinking I pulled it [the gun]
out and started shooting. I never said it
was justification. Like I said, I just
responded myself to certain situations
when I felt threatened, but there was no
justification for my actions.
And your conditioned response for
someone swinging at you, not even
hitting you, is to shoot them twice?
That’s was [sic] my thought process. I
don’t think like that any more, but that’s
how I used to think. It was irrational
but that’s how I used to think.
Well, I see in your statement you talk
about some crimes and violence that
happened in your family when you were
younger, so I understand when you are
growing up and you are young and you
feel threatened or afraid, it flight or
fight. And, when you are a kid, you can’t
just pack up your bags and leave, so by
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default in many instances it has to be
fight. All right, sir, thank you.
Petitioner’s argument to the contrary notwithstanding, the Court finds nothing in
Commissioner Ferguson’s questioning of petitioner to be indicative of a personal bias
warranting reversal of the parole denial determination. Given petitioner’s criminal
history - both before and after the Kings County shooting incident - it is not surprising to
find a parole commissioner skeptical with respect to petitioner’s assertion that he left his
home (presumably with a loaded handgun) intending to defuse a potentially volatile
situation. Commissioner Ferguson was open and direct in expressing his skepticism and
soliciting a response from petitioner. The petitioner, for his part, acknowledge the
“contradiction” between his criminal history and stated intention to act as a peacemaker
on the day of the fatal shooting. In view of the foregoing, the Court finds no basis to
disturb the parole denial determination.
Based upon all of the above, it is, therefore, the decision of the Court and it is
hereby
ADJUDGED, that the petition is dismissed.

Dated:

September 6, 2013 at
Indian Lake, New York.

__________________________
S. Peter Feldstein
Acting Supreme Court Justice
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